

# Defense and Strategic Studies Online

Online Journal of the School of Defense & Strategic Studies  
*Reynolds College of Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities*

Volume 2, No. 1

Autumn 2025

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# Defense and Strategic Studies at MSU: Security Sensibility and Strategic DNA

by

Christopher A. Ford

Welcome to the first issue of the second volume of *Defense & Strategic Studies Online* (DASSO). As we begin our second year in publication, DASSO has decided to take a temporary break from publishing interesting and thought-provoking contributions to contemporary defense, international relations, and security policy debates in order to do a bit of celebrating.

As a new publication, DASSO is happy to be celebrating our own one-year anniversary, of course. But the big news here is that Missouri State University's School of Defense and Strategic Studies – a.k.a. "DSS" – is this year celebrating the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of its arrival in the Washington, D.C., area in 2005. This issue of DASSO is thus dedicated to the DSS program, to let our readers know a bit more about us, giving them a feel for the unique creature we are and acquainting them with our history and what might be said to be our "spirit."

In the pages that follow this introductory essay, you'll hear from three luminaries who have each played important roles in our history. Unfortunately, our founder, Professor William Robert Van Cleave (1935-2013), is no longer available to offer his insights. In the first of the essays that follow, however, our school's current director, former U.S. Army Brigadier General [John P. Rose](#), will recount his own history with DSS – a story arc that begins back in the program's early days at the University of Southern California (USC) under Professor Van Cleave, while yet also bringing us up to the present day.

After Dr. Rose's essay, we reproduce a recent article by DSS' second director, [Dr. Keith B. Payne](#). It is Payne who represents perhaps the strongest connective tissue between the School today and the Van Cleave legacy, and it is Payne whose accomplishment we celebrate with this issue, for he is the man who brought our program to Washington, D.C., upon Van Cleave's retirement. In his article, Payne tells this story and gives his perspective on DSS across its long history since the early 1970s.

After Dr. Payne's essay, we also reproduce an essay by J.D. Crouch – a former student of Professor Van Cleave and a longtime professor with DSS in Springfield, Missouri, who went on to very senior roles at the U.S. Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the United Service Organization (USO). Prepared for a [festschrift volume honoring Professor Van Cleave](#) that was published by the [National Institute for Public Policy](#) (NIPP) in 2007, Crouch's essay provides yet another look across the program's history from an eminent scholar-practitioner.

To close out this celebratory “20 Years in DC!” issue of *DASSO* with compilation that we hope help illustrate one of the ways in which DSS has positioned itself so well to provide superb value for its many students: the remarkable breadth and depth of its faculty members' real-world national security policy experience. Those pages provide a list of the many influential positions that DSS faculty have held in the past, and upon the lessons from which DSS is thus able to draw in educating the students in our doctoral, Master's, and Graduate Certificate programs.

Bear in mind when you read that list, moreover, that this is an account *only* of the high-level backgrounds of DSS faculty *who were on the roster as of August 2025* when we moved to our new office location in Arlington, Virginia. A list of similar positions held over the lifetime of the DSS program would be far longer and more impressive still.

## A School about Strategy and as Strategy

My own perspective upon DSS began to take shape even before I knew that the program existed. In early 2003, I moved from the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to the State Department as a political appointee, taking up the position of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the bureau charged with overseeing U.S. policy related to the verification of compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments. My boss there, Assistant Secretary Paula DeSutter, had gotten a Master's degree in International Relations at USC in 1981, when Professor Van Cleave taught there, and it did not take me long to realize that his students formed a wide and very influential network in the U.S. national security policy community.

In government at the time, I recall frequently encountering interactions within the government that ran more or less along lines similar to the following: "Oh, you're a Van Cleave person? Great! I'm a Van Cleave person, too!" (Those involved would then commonly trade information about years, anecdotes, and mutual acquaintances.) At first this all seemed pretty mysterious to me, as I initially had no idea what a "Van Cleave person" actually was. Nevertheless, whatever these "Van Cleave People" were, they were obviously an influential lot: the administration of President George W. Bush, in which we served, seemed to be chock full of them.

In fact, two of the other Van Cleave alumni who served with me in government at the time were J.D. Crouch and Keith Payne. These were clearly serious players. Crouch former was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy when I first joined the State Department, and would later go on to serve as Deputy National Security Advisor. Payne, in turn, was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy, having already played a seminal role in drafting the [U.S. Nuclear Posture Review](#) in 2001; he would soon also be the man who brought DSS to Washington, D.C. You will hear from both of them later in this issue!

But it didn't take me long to figure out what was going on. The "Van Cleave People" were, of course, alumni, and that period in government was a marvelous illustration of just what a fantastic job Professor Van Cleave had done in building a network of national security professionals well trained and eager to contribute to U.S. national security policy in any time of need. In those first years of what was then termed the "Global War on Terrorism," that network was active and deeply engaged in protecting and advancing our country's interests in a challenging world of security threats, and I had the good fortune to be able to work with and among them.

I am thus *not* myself an "O.G." Defense and Strategic Studies guy, for I came into the national security business by another path and through other institutions. And, alas, I never knew or had the chance to learn from Professor Van Cleave. But ever since those first days at State, I have been keenly aware of just what an interesting – even unique – program DSS is, and have had a growing feel for and appreciation of his legacy. In the pages that follow, I thus offer some thoughts as such an "outsider" about the important role DSS has played in contributing to this nation's security in challenging times.

As Dr. Payne's essay notes, there is some ambiguity in the records about precisely when Professor Van Cleave founded the program. The general consensus at DSS seems to be that the right year is 1971, however, and while the specific date is perhaps not important at this point, I do think that timing suggests a broader point about just what it was that Professor Van Cleave was doing in setting this program in motion.

The year 1971, after all, was an important and challenging one, both in the United States and for it. In the global security environment, major changes were underway. U.S. and Soviet negotiators, for instance, continued formal talks they had begun in 1969 on strategic arms control, with a particular focus on strategic nuclear delivery systems and ballistic missile defenses – talks that would result the very next year in the signing of the [Anti-Ballistic Missile \(ABM\) Treaty](#) and the [Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty Interim Agreement](#) (a.k.a. SALT I). Tensions between the two Cold War rivals and nuclear weapons

superpowers remained high, but they had begun to ease somewhat, and “détente” seemed to be in the air.

The year 1971 also marked the beginning of the United States’ historic opening to the People’s Republic of China (PRC): U.S. President Richard Nixon ended America’s more than two-decade-old blockade of trade with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger secretly flew to Beijing for meetings with Zhou Enlai, and President Nixon announced that he himself would travel to China to meet with Mao Zedong. Thus began an enormous strategic shift that would have momentous consequences, both during the Cold War and – especially – thereafter.

But even for U.S. leaders who regarded these developments as welcome ones, 1971 was not a happy time. The national misery of the Vietnam War continued, and though the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam was already being greatly reduced – falling under 200,000 for the first time since the mid-1960s – the war had grievously divided and traumatized America and Americans. The tide of domestic opinion had turned sharply against the conflict, and currents of deep hostility toward U.S. national security policy had come to flow strongly in U.S. politics.

Remarkably, in fact, the year 1971 was also one in which a group of anti-war clergymen and nuns were indicted for conspiring to kidnap Kissinger and bomb several federal office buildings – and indeed leftist radicals of the Weather Underground set off a bomb in the U.S. Capitol building. More broadly, the nation was convulsed by anti-war protests, with half a million people demonstrating in Washington, D.C., in April and vast crowds descending upon the city the next month in an attempt to shut down the government entirely.

It was also a time of economic woes, for America’s economic problems at the beginning of the 1970s included large current account deficits, rising unemployment, and an acceleration of the 20-year phenomenon of what came later to be known as the “Great Inflation.” A 1971 a run on the U.S. dollar, moreover, precipitated the collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system, with President



[Nixon devaluing the dollar](#), ending the gold standard, and decreeing both a freeze on wage and price controls, and broad import surcharges.

It was in that period of dramatic domestic tensions – the traumas of which [we might do well to remember today for a sense of proportion](#) as we bemoan the poisonous polarization and economic problems of our current political environment – that the young Professor Van Cleave decided to establish a new Defense and Strategic Studies (DSS) program at USC’s School of International Relations (SIR). In hindsight, it seems quite clear that in setting up this program, Van Cleave had an expansive vision in mind: he wasn’t just establishing a program *about* national security policy and strategy, he was setting up one that would *contribute* to policy and strategy in ways he felt our country badly needed. And our program *was* part of *his* strategy.

### Education and Scholarship for Real-World Practice

Then 36 years old, Van Cleave had already had a career in the U.S. Marine Corps, having enlisted at the age of 17 and served as part of the U.S. occupation of Europe after the end of the Second World War. His doctoral dissertation of 1967 from the Claremont Graduate School (now [Claremont Graduate University](#)) had focused on the interaction of technology and international politics through the prism of nuclear weapons proliferation – coming out, serendipitously, just before the completion of the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](#) in 1968 – and Van Cleave was deeply interested in strategic policy, nuclear deterrence, arms control, and the theory and practical politics of national security strategy.

Van Cleave’s new DSS program reflected these interests, and made the study of such issues its trademark right from the beginning, as it provided graduate-level education and training for students planning careers in national and international security affairs and policymaking, as well as in teaching at the university level. As Van Cleave [explained it to a journalist years later, in 2007](#),

Particularly after service in the Defense Department, and having experienced the highly abstract and theoretical pedagogical approaches that prevailed academically at the time, I was determined to make DSS a policy oriented field.

It was his ambition to *avoid* “ivory-tower”-type scholarship and focus instead upon practical application, educating true practitioners. In Van Cleave’s words, he wanted to build a program based upon insights from the “real world and not models of what the world should be.” He wanted its foundation to be “real threat analysis” – including “the realities of arms control as distinct from the wishful thinking of arms control” – and for the program to remain resolutely grounded in a sober appreciation of security challenges and the need to meet them.

The distinctly steel-eyed and security-focused flavor of this approach did not necessarily always endear Van Cleave to his academic peers in the California of 1970s America, but it proved a strong foundation for the DSS program, which thrived. He ran DSS at USC until 1987, at which point he and DSS relocated to Southwest Missouri State University (SMSU).

The move seems to have been, in part, a move by Van Cleave to ensure the program’s ability to preserve its distinctive, no-nonsense practitioner’s focus upon real-world security challenges. As Van Cleave [later put it](#),

Without being political, one can see ... that fellow academics would regard both the very topic and the way I taught it as politically “conservative” and “hard line” ....

He stressed that “it was not a partisan political program,” and that “[w]hen research and analysis led to criticism, even severe, of national security policies and actions, there was no distinction” made between the policies of the two U.S. political parties. Nevertheless, in Van Cleave’s recollection, the SIR faculty at USC

steadily became homogeneous politically and pedagogically, and nearly uniformly hostile [to the



program]. A faculty of some 18 could not tolerate a single “conservative” national security program ....

Van Cleave remained devoted to ensuring DSS’ ability to continue to pursue its distinctive approach to practitioner-focused national security education. [According to one former USC administrator](#), however, challenges began to arise in connection with “curricular changes” and questions about DSS’ “autonomy” in response to “constraints that were being imposed [on the program] by the department and also by the university.” Van Cleave’s commitment to the DSS’ approach thereafter led him – a native of Kansas City, Missouri – to take the program with him back to his home state.

Whatever the details of his parting from USC, the move to Missouri was a success. By that point, Southwest Missouri State was already the second-largest public university in the state. At SMSU, DSS became a full-fledged academic “center” in 1987, and thereafter a full department by 1990, offering a Master of Science degree in Defense and Strategic Studies. SMSU became [Missouri State University](#) (MSU) in 2005, and DSS is now a full-fledged “School” at MSU, a component of the [Reynolds College of Arts, Social Sciences, and Humanities](#) (RCASH).

As you’ll learn about more from Drs. Rose and Payne later in this issue, 20 years ago, in 2005 – just as Southwest Missouri State was transforming itself into Missouri State University – DSS moved again. It retained its productive relationship with the home campus in Springfield, Missouri, but it now relocated its offices and classrooms to the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area in order to be closer to the primary locus of national (and indeed global) power and national security activity. Van Cleave himself retired that year, and he was succeeded in the program directorship by Dr. Payne, who had known and worked with Van Cleave for years after receiving his PhD at USC in 1981.

And, as recounted further later in this issue, DSS has indeed thrived since its relocation to the Washington area. Most recently, of course, this has included gaining accreditation in 2020 from the

national [Higher Learning Commission](#)\* for a professional doctorate program, expanding its range of Graduate Certificates, launching [the journal you are now reading](#), and moving to our new location in Arlington, Virginia, within sight of the Washington Monument and close to the Pentagon, the White House, and the Department of State.

As Van Cleave intended, however, these successes have done nothing to attenuate DSS’ distinctive emphasis upon giving hard-nosed attention to real-world security challenges as – [in the words of one journalist](#) – the program “caters to students who want to break into Beltway defense circles with a public university price tag and the advantages of a more practical approach.” As should hardly be surprising for a program founded by a scholarly ex-Marine who had advised the Nixon Administration on the SALT I negotiations, was part of the “[Team B” outside expert assessment of U.S. intelligence on the Soviet Union](#), and served as chief defense advisor to candidate Ronald Reagan during the 1980 presidential campaign – later also running President-elect Reagan’s Defense Department transition team – the DSS program has always been unabashedly committed to understanding and promoting deterrence (including nuclear deterrence) and issues related to the protection and advancement of U.S. national security interests.

The program takes no institutional position on any specific political or policy issue, of course, and the DSS faculty contains scholar-experts of various political stripes. As Dr. Payne [has himself noted](#),

No one should want to train students just from one particular perspective [anyway] .... The intention is to provide a range of approaches and consciously to do so, because the students need to know that and have that as they go into positions.

Nevertheless, as Van Cleave’s description of his move to Missouri attests, the program’s generally security-focused and “realistic” flavor has been unmistakable from the outset. This emphasis – and the fact that [so many of its faculty have played roles in](#)

Republican presidential administrations – has sometimes irritated those on the dovish political Left, but DSS has never felt any need to apologize for its commitment to educating students to become wise and resolute stewards and guardians of this nation's security interests in a challenging world in which robust deterrence remains (alas) as necessary as ever.

At a time in which American higher education seems to be in rather a crisis, moreover – with enrollments generally stagnant or falling, and with its most prominent institutions caught between those who fear it has been hijacked by political and cultural values alien to the American mainstream and those who fear for its independence from government control – DSS feels to some of us like of an oasis of sanity. We are a program solidly rooted in Middle American sensibilities through our umbilical cord back to the home campus in Springfield, Missouri, yet we are at the same time deeply embedded and influential in the world of national security professionals centered on the Pentagon, the White House, the Department of State, and Capitol Hill. We remain true to the approach charted for us by our founder more than 40 years ago, our program is growing, we're delighted with our new offices, and we feel ourselves to have a very bright future.

DSS has thus already had a remarkable career. With its new offices near the Pentagon, with the professional doctoral program continuing to increase its enrollment, and with recent legislative changes in the State of Missouri that will allow MSU to offer PhD research degrees for the first time, DSS feels like it is continuing to accelerate. We hope and believe that Professor Van Cleave would be proud of what his program has become, and of the role DSS continues to play in educating the national security practitioners this nation needs in confronting the challenges it faces in a dangerous world.

We hope you enjoy this commemorative issue celebrating our 20 years in the Washington, D.C., area – and we look forward to many more successful years to come!

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## About the Author

**Christopher Ford** is DASSO's Editor in Chief and a professor with the School of Defense and Strategic Studies. In prior government service, Dr. Ford was U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation in 2018-21, for the last 15 months of that period also performing the duties of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. Prior to that, he served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for WMD and Counterproliferation at the National Security Council. A Rhodes Scholar with degrees from Harvard, Oxford, and Yale, Dr. Ford has also been U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, a staffer on five different U.S. Senate committees, a think tank scholar with Hudson Institute and the Hoover Institution, and a U.S. Navy intelligence officer. He is the author of the books *China Looks at the West: Identity, Global Ambitions, and the Future of Sino-American Relations* (2015), *The Mind of Empire: China's History and Modern Foreign Relations* (2010), and *The Admirals' Advantage: U.S. Navy Operational Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War* (2005).

*The views expressed herein are entirely the author's own, and do not necessarily represent those of anyone else.*

## Notes

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\* DSS is also certified by the [State Council of Higher Education for Virginia](#) (SCHEV).

# **My Journey with the Defense and Strategic Studies Program**

by

John P. Rose

On the occasion of the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the arrival of Missouri State University's Defense and Strategic Studies Program (a.k.a. DSS) in the Washington, D.C., area, it is a pleasure to offer the readers of our new journal some reflections on my own journey with the program – which stretches from its early years at the University of Southern California (USC) in the 1970s to our thriving reality of the present here in Arlington, Virginia, just a proverbial stone's throw from the Pentagon.

## **The Past**

I was a Captain in the U.S. Army in the early 1970s, having served for a year in Vietnam and done a further three-year tour in Germany. Those were challenging years for the U.S. Army, with our withdrawal from the Vietnam War and the collapse of our South Vietnamese ally underway, and with fierce anti-war protest wracking American society. Army leadership was well aware of the overwhelming negative feelings toward our military at that time, however, and it initiated a program to send officers into graduate education as a measure designed not only to improve the education of U.S. servicemembers, but also to help change the thinking of the American public toward the men and women who in the armed forces.

Because my commanding officer in Germany had worked with DSS' founder, Dr. William Van Cleave, on the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, he urged me to apply to the program. Professor Van Cleave – a former Marine very proud of his service – was dedicated to advancing studies in defense and security matters at a critical time during the Cold War, and he was known in the Defense Department as a scholar who took national security very seriously. After his own service, Van Cleave had returned to the University of Southern California, thereafter becoming director of USC's Defense and Strategic Studies graduate program.

I had been an accounting major in college, had had never written a research paper in my life, but I was fascinated by my worldwide experiences in the Army and wanted to understand the American and global security situation. Taking a chance, I applied to the Van Cleave program, and much to my surprise, I was accepted. To imagine that I would ever be Director of the School of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (MSU), however – the successor to the DSS program that Van Cleave had started at USC – was something I never envisioned even in my wildest dreams.

### **Coming Back to DSS**

After a full career in the military, a short time with a defense contracting firm, and eight years as the Director of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies – a German-American partnership program in Garmisch, Germany – I was contacted by my former USC classmate and Director of the DSS Graduate Program, Dr. Keith Payne. A friend, mentor, and world class strategist, Dr. Payne had become the successor to Professor Van Cleave at DSS, a program which had followed Van Cleave to what is now Missouri State University (MSU) when he had relocated there from California. Payne asked me to join his team to teach students on a variety of security topics. Having taught for three years at the United States Military Academy at West Point, I felt comfortable doing so.

At the end of May 2019, Payne retired from his duties as the director of the DSS program but continued to teach as an emeritus



professor. I applied for the position he vacated, and was offered the job. I assumed the duties as the head of the department on January 6, 2020.

## **Growth and Expansion**

Building on Dr. Van Cleave's vision and the fantastic work that Dr. Payne did in setting DSS up in the Washington area, we've been fortunate to see the program continue to grow. Dr. Payne started DSS with roughly 35 students when the program was relocated here in 2005, and it has now grown to over 300 students today, participating from all over the world.

Nor is DSS just MSU's "Department" of Defense and Strategic Studies anymore. As a result of a reorganization at Missouri State University, the DSS program was elevated to be the *School* of Defense and Strategic Studies on July 1, 2023, and became part of the [Reynolds College of Arts, Social Sciences, and Humanities](#) (RCASH).

DSS' programming has also expanded, in addition to its scale. It was Dr. Van Cleave's vision when he moved his program to Missouri to establish a professional doctoral program for men and women interested in public service and dedicated to the defense and security of the United States. It was Dr. Payne that brought that vision to life. His lengthy, determined, and extraordinary effort led to a proposal for a professional doctoral program that was fully approved by the authorities at MSU, the associated Missouri Department of Higher Education, and ultimately by the State Council of Higher Education for Virginia (SCHEV). It is today the largest professional doctoral program in defense and strategic studies in the United States.

Our professional Doctorate in Defense and Strategic Studies (DDSS) began enrolling students in fall 2020. Anticipating interest for roughly 8-10 students a year, the demand for the doctorate program turned out to far exceed the expectation. To date, more than 187 doctoral candidates have been accepted into the program after vetting by a board of eight faculty members, 13 students have earned doctorates, and several of their capstone research projects have already

been published. (These authors include [Rebecca Heinrichs](#), [Jennifer Bradley](#), and [Kathleen Ellis](#), all impressively established as experts in the field.)

Students who pursue the DSS doctorate are largely mid-career professionals – frequently active-duty members of the U.S. armed services – often with families and working full time in the security arena. They work in defense, diplomacy, intelligence, homeland security, legal positions, on combat command staffs, on Capitol Hill, with civilian defense contractor companies, and in nuclear enterprise positions around the world. They are valuable assets to their organizations. The DSS degree is a practice-focused program designed to prepare them for strategic leadership roles and to better understand the complexity and challenges of today’s complex, dangerous, and challenging global security environment.

A key element to our success at DSS is our per-course faculty of over 30 experienced and dedicated professionals. All but two of our professors teach on a per-course basis, and none of us are career academics. All bring deep “real world” experience to the job, for practice and policy engagement is deep in our DNA at DSS. Each faculty member is selected based on his or her background and experience in national security affairs, and all of them have notable experience not merely as thinkers *about* their field but as seasoned practitioners *in* it. Our faculty members, in other words, have been where the men and women of our student body want to go – in the military, in diplomacy, in intelligence, in the law, and in various aspects of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) business. Making all this work behind the scenes, moreover, is our fantastically dedicated part-time staff team of Caron Tolton, Julie Jeffrey, Kathy Fedorchak, and Darci Nelson.

Beyond the doctorate program, our Master’s degree program has expanded as well. Currently, we have agreements with the U.S. Army’s [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear \(CBRN\) School](#) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri – as well as pending agreements with the Engineer School and the Military Police School – whereby Army officers are able to advance their professional skills by

attending our program as their Captains Career Course. To date, we have 157 U.S. Army Chemical Corps officers accepted into the program. Fifty-nine of them have completed their degree, while ten have so far been accepted into the doctoral program and four have earned that degree.

In addition, in the Fall of 2017, the [United States Air Force Institute of Technology](#) (USAFIT) – located at Wright Patterson Air Force Base outside of Dayton, Ohio – entered into an agreement with us to bring USAFIT missileers, pilots, and others with associated skills (especially from the nuclear weapons enterprise) into our program. DSS’ collaborative efforts, therefore, continue to flourish and grow. Nor are these partnerships limited to the United States. In fact, we also have an agreement in place to accept officers from their Australian Army’s Engineer Branch into the DSS Master’s program.

### **An Unparalleled Program**

In July of 2025, the DSS office and in-person classrooms moved from Fairfax, Virginia, to fantastic new facilities in Arlington, Virginia, located just across the street from the Court House Metro station. This location brings the DSS program near the heart of U.S. national security affairs in Washington, D.C., allowing easy access for potential students from the Department of Defense, the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Department of State, other government agencies, Congress, and major Washington think tanks who are interested in attending DSS in-resident programs and events and accessing our library.

Though our new offices are extraordinarily convenient for D.C.-area national security professionals, however, one need not actually *be* in Washington to take advantage of DSS classes each evening. Far from it. Especially since Covid pandemic, our use of Zoom technology has exploded, providing us the ability to offer students the chance to attend attending our classes from anywhere in the world.

Today, in fact, *most* of our many students attend via the Internet. As an illustration, a recent “Emerging Strategic Challenges” seminar

of 12 students – taught from 6:00 to 9:00 p.m. Eastern time once a week, which is a typical class profile for our program – had three students actually in our classroom, but also one student participating via Zoom from Tokyo (an 11 hour time difference from the DSS offices), a U.S. Air Force officer at Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany (a six hour time difference); a U.S. Army Chemical officer participating from Romania (a seven hour time difference), a student in Canada, a student in Alaska, and others from other locations in the United States.

There is nothing unusual about such a sprawling geographic profile: we are, in effect, a global organization. Even more flexibly, asynchronous online classes are also available for students who are deployed and unable to participate in our typical evening seminar on U.S. Eastern time. (Roughly half of our courses are offered online.)

The DSS student community also extends beyond those in our doctoral and Master's programs, for our graduate certificate programs have also expanded in recent years. In 2025, in fact, we gained approval and began offerings multiple new certificate programs. As a result, the DSS program now offers certificates (1) Defense and Strategic Studies; (2) Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction; (3) Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; (4) Great Power Competition; and (5) National Security Strategy. (A Certificate in Cyber Security Policy is also currently pending approval.) These certificates expand opportunities for students to hone their knowledge and skills in critical security areas without requiring the time commitment and expense of our longer programs. Should a student receiving such a certificate wish to continue into the Master's or doctoral programs, however, all completed courses can be transferred to the final degree.

Over the past several years, new classes have been offered to keep pace with the new threats and challenges that have emerged in the security environment. They include seminars on: Advanced National Security Strategy; Arctic Security Challenges; Cybersecurity Risk; Adapting Deterrence Strategy to Two Nuclear Peers; Great Power Competition; Wargaming; Advanced Chemical and Biological Warfare; and Building Partner Capacity in Defense and Foreign Policy.

MSU also partners with [Masaryk University](#) in the Czech Republic to offer our students an opportunity to participate in international exchanges addressing energy security and global international affairs. Under a student exchange program agreement, our students can participate in a semester studying at Masaryk and Masaryk students can participate in DSS programs. This program has existed for over ten years and continues to grow. In our most recent exchange program, for instance, we had ten students attend Energy Security and International Security seminars there.

What's more, at a time in which America's higher education system has become all but synonymous with staggering costs and student debt, DSS is able to offer our high-caliber Washington-based national security educational programming not just in such flexible formats, but at Missouri public university rates. It is truly a unique resource for rising national security professionals.

## **Conclusion**

Looking to the future, we anticipate a further expansion of our course offerings related to emerging security issues, as well as to leverage our new location as a venue for conferences specializing in complex and challenging security issues, evening lectures and panel events by world-class experts, and hybrid course offerings covering a weekend or two. We expect our Arlington offices and classrooms to become an attractive learning center where national security professionals of all ranks and specialties can learn, express their views, challenge their own (and each other's) perspectives, and collaborate in identifying new approaches to help address the most serious, complex, and global security threats – and seize the most important national security opportunities – this country faces.

We aim to teach our students to think strategically, critically, and with a long-term perspective that will let them make seminal contributions in their fields, advise senior leaders, and develop into high-level decision-makers able to operate effectively across the many complexities of the national security arena. We want them to be consummate national security policy professionals comfortable with

the full range of current threats and opportunities – including in strategic deterrence, defense and security requirements, WMD threats, cyber strategy, great power competition, modern warfare and strategy, pandemic threats, energy security challenges, the changing global climate, hybrid warfare challenges and continued terrorist threats.

Our graduates face a complex and dangerous global environment, but they should not be discouraged by the challenges that lie ahead. They are talented and motivated, and we at DSS are dedicated to helping them grow and mature as national security professionals able to rise to the challenges of our times. It's been an honor to be part of this program.

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## **About the Author**

**John P. Rose** is Director of the School of Defense and Strategic Studies, and has been a faculty member there since 2011. From 2002 until 2010, Dr. Rose served as Director of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. Before that, he was the U.S. Army's Director for Requirements at the Pentagon (1995-98), director of the Requirements and International Programs Branch at NATO's Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium (1992-95), and a professor at the U.S Military Academy (1979-81). Dr. Rose received his PhD in International Relations from the University of Southern California in 1978 under Professor William Van Cleave.

*The views expressed herein are entirely the author's own, and do not necessarily represent those of anyone else.*



## **Defense and Strategic Studies: A Brief History**

by

Keith B. Payne

The Defense and Strategic Studies (DSS) program started at the University of Southern California (USC) in Los Angeles. The exact year of its initiation is not entirely clear. I have seen 1969, 1971, and 1976 as the starting point from three different individuals close to the program. They may all be correct, each describing something a bit different in the development of DSS. I tend to accept the 1971 date as the beginning point; DSS was thriving, with several advanced Ph.D. students, by the time I arrived as a first-year graduate student in August 1976.

It is important to focus on the origins of DSS and its founder, Professor William R. Van Cleave, to understand the program's uniqueness then, and now. Prof. Van Cleave entered USC as a young professor in 1967, founded DSS there, and led it until his retirement in 2005. His portrait, as a young Marine, hangs prominently in the DSS offices for those students who have wondered, "who is that?" Millions of people have used one of the ancestry services to find out about their family roots. I would like to provide an overview of DSS roots that continue to shape its curriculum and educational goals after more than five decades.

## DSS Origins

At USC, DSS was not a separate academic department, but rather a selected concentration of courses within the university's School of International Relations (SIR). It was an anomaly within the SIR for multiple reasons. For example, if Professor Van Cleave was to serve as the chair of a student's Ph.D. committee, the student had to take several specific courses offered by Prof. Van Cleave (or "VC" as we students referred to him amongst ourselves), and additional courses in three other related concentrations, *e.g.*, Russian, Chinese, and/or European studies, theory, political economy, *inter alia*.<sup>1</sup> The SIR required only *three* fields of concentration for the PhD; Prof. Van Cleave required *four*. That additional concentration requirement may seem minimal. But when doctoral comprehensive exams loomed, having to take an exam in four areas of concentration vice three loomed large. In addition, the comprehensive PhD exam given by Professor Van Cleave was known to be particularly challenging – a one-week take-home exam that, in my case, demanded a 55-page response.

These requirements for earning a doctorate under Prof. Van Cleave tended to limit the number of students eager to do so. Still, he was regularly voted favorite professor on campus and generally had as many PhD students taking his classes and his course concentration on national security affairs as did the rest of the SIR faculty combined. This may have bred some resentment among some other members of the faculty – which typically generated only a smile and a joke from Professor Van Cleave.

## The DSS Curriculum Under Professor Van Cleave

Professor Van Cleave's main course, International Relations (IR) 474, was notoriously challenging, but also a student favorite because he focused on "real world" issues in ways not typically found in academia. Professor Van Cleave did not bury an inherently dynamic and fascinating subject with a narrow focus, dreary academic jargon, excessive nuance, or diplomatic pretense – all of which tend to obscure rather than promote understanding. Instead, he focused on the "real

world” histories of relations among countries, and the realities of their hostility, including (as appropriate at the height of the Cold War) between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the armaments that followed from that hostility. Students learned about the vast differences in the U.S. and Soviet approaches to their respective foreign and defense policies without varnish or academic niceties. Professor Van Cleave explained the harsh realities that often attend international relations clearly, sugar-coating nothing with academic or diplomatic language. He did not ignore theory, but he made sure that students understood the connection between theory and the actual practice of international relations.

Professor Van Cleave also brought guest speakers to his class that students would otherwise not experience. One of the most memorable guest speakers he brought to IR 474 was a fighter/survivor (code-named “Bear”) who participated in, and almost perished in, the 1943 Warsaw Ghetto uprising against the horrific German occupation. Students walked away from such exposures and Professor Van Cleave’s classes with a new interest in, and greater understanding of, international relations. His focus, lectures and guest speakers were eye-opening – even fascinating – which often is not the case in IR courses.

This unique character of Professor Van Cleave’s entire curriculum was not an accident. He had served as a delegate to the original Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union and was intent on creating a graduate curriculum that prepared students for the harsh realities of international security affairs and for professional service in national security. His vision was to create a graduate program that combined solid scholarly credentials with a sober appreciation of how government policy is made and how governments often interact – neither of which is pretty. This “real world” focus was unique at the time and remains rare in academia.

Why this focus? When called on to testify before the U.S. Senate on the SALT agreements on which he had labored, Professor Van Cleave ultimately opposed the agreements and attributed at least some of the U.S. failings at SALT to the lack of realism with which senior

U.S. officials approached international relations in general, and in relations with the Soviet Union in particular. Indeed, in a display of personal courage, he was the *only* person to testify *in opposition to the* SALT agreements, which were roundly celebrated in Washington as a monumental success. Professor Van Cleave's Senate testimony against SALT, which we now know was entirely prescient regarding its ultimate consequences, is available and remains essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the subject; it reflects his motivation for developing the unique DSS curriculum for graduate students.<sup>2</sup>

In 2007, *Bloomberg News* carried an article on DSS. In it, the late Prof. Robert Jervis from Columbia University, one of the world's most prominent international relations academics, commented on the DSS program. He said that DSS was somewhat outside the academic mainstream but within the U.S. policy mainstream.<sup>3</sup> Both parts of that description were/are true. Indeed, DSS graduates had contributed mightily to the creation of that U.S. policy mainstream. Whether Prof. Jervis meant that comment for good or ill, it was the greatest compliment he could have made regarding DSS. He captured what Prof. Van Cleave had sought to create and his underlying basic conclusion: a graduate program has to be somewhat outside the academic mainstream to prepare graduate students for the real world of international security affairs.

### **Professor Van Cleave's Legacy With DSS**

To say that Professor Van Cleave was successful in realizing his vision of a graduate program that combines solid scholarship with realism is an understatement. He was the most influential academic of the twentieth century in the field of U.S. national security policy. The measure of merit for this assessment is not official titles held nor prominent books written, although Professor Van Cleave served in significant positions and authored several excellent texts. Other twentieth century academics were more prominent by those measures, including Henry Kissinger and Kenneth Waltz.

However, the measure of merit here is Professor Van Cleave's direct and indirect effect on U.S. national security policy and practice.

His unparalleled contribution was not only through his own work, but, perhaps more importantly, through the work of the many hundreds of DSS graduates he mentored who have pursued careers in government, industry, the military, and academia. No other professor or program I know of has had such an impact for so many years – an impact that will continue for decades to come.

A former Director of the SIR at USC, Professor Robert English, had previously worked in the Pentagon and, while there, had become familiar with many of Professor Van Cleave's students also working there. While not always agreeing with Professor Van Cleave, Professor English aptly described Professor Van Cleave's students and his corresponding impact on U.S. national security policy:

I have to say that Van Cleave's proteges were among the best informed, hardest working and most dedicated to the national interest that I knew in nearly a decade of policy analysis .... Looking back over the years ... his impact on foreign policy debates and decision-making was such that few academics in *any* area had more direct influence on U.S. policy than he did.<sup>4</sup>

That is a lasting legacy of Professor Van Cleave and the DSS program he founded.

Many hundreds of DSS graduates have occupied and continue to move into senior civilian and military national security positions. Commentaries on DSS understandably often focus on several of Professor Van Cleave's most prominent graduates, but his contribution to national security policy and practice follows much more from the many hundreds of DSS students who have pursued life-long careers in national security – with solid scholarly credentials and a realistic understanding of international relations.

Prof. Van Cleave did not care what students looked like, where they came from, or their political affiliations. He welcomed students from all backgrounds into this endeavor – he demanded only that his students be ready to think and work hard – he had little patience for

those who would not. His students reflected considerable diversity before that became a slogan.

An illustrative example of the dedicated students who moved from Professor Van Cleave's program at USC to the Washington professional community is his first PhD graduate, Dr. Mark Schneider (PhD, 1974). Dr. Schneider started at the Atomic Energy Commission, moved to the staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee, then to the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. He then transitioned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) where, for the next two decades, he advanced to increasingly responsible positions in the Senior Executive Service dealing with nuclear forces and arms control policies. Prior to retirement from government service in 2004, Dr. Schneider served as Principal Director for Forces Policy – and he continues to be an influential writer in the field. This career path is extraordinary and, when multiplied many times over, reflects the impact of Professor Van Cleave and DSS.

To say that Dr. Schneider personally contributed to U.S. nuclear and arms control policies is an understatement. His DSS academic background that focused, by Dr. Van Cleave's design, on the realistic application of theory to international security affairs informed his approach to understanding and addressing the "real world" problems he confronted professionally on a daily basis.

Dr. Van Cleave's vision for DSS, which continues to this day to be the *modus operandi* for DSS, has literally launched more than two generations of graduates into their professional careers. The DSS motto, "from the classroom to the field" is not just a jolly slogan; it captures the heart of Prof. Van Cleave's vision realized in DSS.

### **DSS Moves to Southwest Missouri State University**

The DSS goals, focus, curriculum and academic approach established by Professor Van Cleave did not always comport easily within USC's SIR or with other faculty members there. There was nearly unremitting drama as the SIR increasingly sought to capture and restructure Professor Van Cleave's curriculum to make it conform



to more typical academic patterns – the very patterns against which he rebelled. Professor Van Cleave and his PhD students resisted these efforts for years.

However, finally tiring of the energy and attention demanded by the ongoing drama, in 1987 Professor Van Cleave moved the entire DSS program to Southwest Missouri State University (SMSU), in Springfield, Missouri, where it became a separate department. The host university changed, but the curriculum remained focused on a professionally oriented, “real world” understanding of international security affairs. At SMSU, Professor Van Cleave also was able to bring in several excellent younger colleagues to help teach in the SMSU DSS program, which enrolled 50-60 students every semester.

The main academic downside attending the move from USC to SMSU was that the latter was not allowed to offer a doctoral degree program – folks at SMSU informed me that the option was well guarded by the University of Missouri, and its supporters in the Missouri state legislature. Consequently, the highest DSS degree awarded by SMSU was a Master of Science (M.S.). At SMSU, Prof. Van Cleave had no doctoral students.

Nevertheless, he maintained a highly demanding curriculum at SMSU, with requirements that competed with a PhD program by his design. DSS graduates from SMSU continued to move successfully into professional careers in the field, primarily in Washington, D.C. They seamlessly and easily joined the ranks of earlier graduates from USC and the combined network continued to move into the Pentagon, the State Department, Capitol Hill, the National Security Council Staff, defense industry and Washington-area “think tanks.” DSS graduates from USC and SMSU often were referred to, in a friendly way, as “the Van Cleave mafia.” This was a reflection of the on-going cohesion and camaraderie of many DSS graduates working in Washington—whether from USC or SMSU. An [article in \*Inside Higher Ed\*](#) rightly captured the advantageous relationship between USC and MSU alumni and new DSS graduates,

The program's rich network of alumni, spanning the USC and Missouri years, has also helped graduates find jobs in the defense industry, policy circles and the government ....<sup>5</sup>

This was, and remains, a community that welcomes new DSS graduates into the field.

### **DSS Moves to the Washington Metropolitan Area**

DSS flourished at SMSU in Springfield. However, in late 2003 – after over three decades leading DSS, first at USC and then at SMSU – Professor Van Cleave decided to begin the process of retiring and finding a successor for DSS. It was at this point that he first inquired of my interest in joining DSS as the new department head at SMSU. My response was that the position was interesting, but moving from the Washington, D.C., area to Springfield, Missouri was not an option for me. Professor Van Cleave responded that his plan for DSS had always, ultimately, included relocation of DSS to the Washington, D.C. area for all of the obvious advantages that such a move would provide DSS students. Consequently, his resignation, my departure from teaching at Georgetown University (after 21 years) and acceptance of the position as his successor at DSS, and the department's move to Washington all came together in July 2005. At the same time, fortunately, the state of Missouri shortened the name Southwest Missouri State University to the more elegant Missouri State University (MSU).

The DSS move to Washington, with classes beginning in August 2005, was not without serious challenges. Financial difficulties followed almost immediately; fewer than 40 students made the move to the Washington area – largely because of the much higher living costs. This low initial enrollment, in combination with very limited financial support for DSS from MSU in Springfield, presented an immediate challenge that appeared terminal for the program.

DSS had moved from Springfield, where it was the only such program within hundreds of miles, to the Washington, D.C., area,

where several prestigious universities offered curricula oriented around national security, notably Georgetown University's graduate National Security Studies Program. DSS had been geared for success in Springfield, not in the very different academic environment of Washington, D.C. The anecdotal stories of how MSU was ill-prepared to compete for excellent graduate students in this new market are legion – some humorous, others not.

Nevertheless, financial support, primarily from foundations that understood and appreciated Professor Van Cleave's academic vision, provided the needed immediate relief. This, eventually, was followed by consistently outstanding support from the Springfield campus by the new MSU Dean with authority over DSS, Dr. Victor Matthews – who is now retired, but should be recognized as a hero of DSS at MSU. The number of enrolled DSS students also grew steadily. The combination of increasingly generous foundation grants, consistent university support from the Dean, and increasing enrollment eventually put DSS on a firm footing. Each part of that formula was, and remains, necessary.

With consistent support from foundations and Dean Matthews at MSU, and increasing enrollment, DSS was able to hire several office administrators and dozens of adjunct faculty with excellent academic credentials and “hands-on, real world” professional experience from the Departments of Defense and State, the White House, Capitol Hill and the intelligence community. The DSS transition from being a single professor, specialized curriculum at USC, to a small department at MSU in Springfield, Missouri, to a much larger enterprise in the Washington, D.C., area, was complete. Indeed, one member of the new DSS adjunct faculty subsequently served as the U.S. Secretary of Defense – a claim few schools can make. The explosive increase in DSS faculty and course offerings was necessary to keep up with increasing student enrollment.

With the DSS relocation to the Washington, D.C. area, new opportunities for the program and students expanded. Students now had enviable internship opportunities, some of which were paid very well. (In one case, DSS professors half-jokingly said they would like

to apply for the internship). The resources and contacts in the area for students in the field of national security affairs are unparalleled; they cannot be duplicated anywhere outside of Washington.

The relocation also opened new opportunities for the DSS program. For example, DSS was soon invited to offer courses at the Army Management and Staff College, located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Foreign graduate students began showing increasing interest in attending DSS, and DSS established a successful exchange program with Masaryk University in the Czech Republic. DSS also bid on, and won, a contract with the Defense Department to co-host a graduate degree program with the National Defense University. As a result, roughly 20 highly-qualified, mid-career students from DoD enrolled each year in what became an extremely successful, decade-long DSS program.

The success of the DSS cooperative program with the National Defense University became widely known within military education circles, and led to two additional important new opportunities for DSS. First was a request from leaders at Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri for DSS to bid on a contract to offer courses to students there – a contract that DSS again was awarded. The second new opportunity was an initiative by the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) to enroll select students in DSS. The result of these developments was the inflow into DSS of several new streams of highly-qualified, mid-career students, mostly U.S. Army or Air Force officers.

Perhaps the single most significant development among many following the relocation to the Washington, D.C., area was the establishment of a DSS professional doctorate degree. In 2018, the senior leadership at MSU invited me to draft a proposal for such a DSS degree after the Missouri state legislature decided to allow MSU the option. This was MSU's first effort to take advantage of the new opportunity granted by the state legislature. I wrote that proposal purposefully to encourage the many earlier DSS graduates with M.S. degrees to further their graduate education by enrolling for a DSS professional doctorate degree (DDSS). Numerous DSS graduates over

the years had mentioned that they hoped DSS would offer a doctorate degree.

The Missouri state legislature had approved the option for a DSS professional doctorate degree, not a PhD. This option, in fact, fit well with most DSS students' educational and professional goals, and the overall DSS leitmotif envisioned by Professor Van Cleave decades ago. The proposal for this new degree program required a year to write, and its acceptance by all the necessary governing authorities required another year. Nevertheless, in the fall semester of 2020, DSS enrolled the initial pilot class into its new DDSS program. DSS had, at last, recovered from the main downside of its relocation to SMSU. The DDSS program has been even more successful than expected, now enrolling approximately 140 doctoral students – likely making it the largest such program in the country.

Following my retirement from DSS in 2019, Dr. John Rose (BG, U.S. Army, Ret.) became the new DSS head. He led the unparalleled expansions of the DDSS program and the cooperative venture with the U.S. Army at Fort Leonard Wood. These are the results of his remarkable and untiring efforts and leadership. In addition, under Dr. Rose's effective guidance, DSS became the *School* of Defense and Strategic Studies vice the *Department* of Defense and Strategic Studies, another positive transition. DSS advancements under his leadership have come as no surprise to anyone familiar with him. Dr. Rose earned his PhD under Professor Van Cleave's earlier DSS program at USC. Following graduation, he went on to a remarkable career in the U.S. Army, served as an award-winning professor at West Point Military Academy, and subsequently headed the U.S. Army's prestigious George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies located in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany—enrolling over 1,000 students from over 100 participating countries. Dr. Rose's outstanding educational and professional background, many talents, and amazing work ethic fit perfectly with the unending demands of the position at DSS.



## **DSS: Where to Now?**

After two decades located in Fairfax, Virginia, just outside the famous “beltway” surrounding Washington, D.C., DSS has recently moved to new facilities in Arlington, Virginia, closer to the Capital. Successfully completing such a relocation is no small task. How DSS will fare in the future and in its new location will depend on numerous enduring factors – particularly continuing dedicated leadership that devotes enormous time and energy to the task, just as Dr. Rose has done, and as Professor Van Cleave and I did earlier. In addition, as noted above, three keys to continued DSS success are: support from MSU In Springfield; foundation support; and graduate student enthusiasm. None of these can be taken for granted, but DSS has established an enviable history and reputation that should facilitate continued success. In particular, the formula originally conceived by Professor Van Cleave and sustained by Dr. Rose and myself – the rigorous and realistic study of international security affairs unburdened by deadening academic fashion and jargon, or diplomatic pretense – virtually ensures that the subject will be both of unquestioned import and fascinating for students.

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, the international security environment has only grown more complex and challenging since Professor Van Cleave established DSS five decades ago. The old Soviet threat and bipolar world have been replaced by a much more complex and dangerous international threat context. As President William Clinton’s CIA Director, R. James Woolsey, observed early in the post-Cold War era:

We have slain a large dragon. But we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of.<sup>6</sup>

DSS is a national treasure. If sustained properly, its graduates will continue to contribute enormously as the United States seeks to address the many looming, “bewildering” security challenges of the contemporary international security context.



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## About the Author

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*This essay was originally published by the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) as Number 634 (August 27, 2025) in its Information Series. It appears here with gracious permission from NIPP.<sup>7</sup>*

## Notes

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- <sup>1</sup> At the time, many of Professor Van Cleave's Ph.D. students also studied a foreign language on the side, usually Russian.
  - <sup>2</sup> See, "From the Archive: Dr. William R. Van Cleave, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Southern California, Testimony before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, July 25, 1972," *Journal of Policy & Strategy*, vol. 2, no. 3, 2022, <https://nipp.org/journals/volume-2-2022/>.
  - <sup>3</sup> See Judy Mathewson, "College Parlays Bush Ties to Build a Name in National Security," *Bloomberg.com*, June 8, 2007, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&refer=home&sid=aB8Q8UJowDkw>.
  - <sup>4</sup> Quoted in, Pamela Johnson, "In Memoriam: William Van Cleave, 77," *USCDornsife*, March 21, 2013, <https://dornsife.usc.edu/news/stories/in-memoriam-william-van-cleave-77/>.
  - <sup>5</sup> Quoted in, Andy Guess, "Mixing Theory and Practice on Defense Policy," *Inside Higher Ed*, August 8, 2007, <http://insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/08defense>.
  - <sup>6</sup> R. James Woolsey, *Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, February 2, 1993 (mimeographed prepared statement), 2.
  - <sup>7</sup> **Editor's Note:** *Some alterations to the formatting of this essay have been made in reprinting it here, but the text has not been altered.*

# **Transcending the Academic Haze, or How I Learned to Learn about the Bomb**

by

J.D. Crouch II

In the fall of 1978, I was an undergraduate international relations major, a junior, facing “cognitive dissonance,” a fancy academic term I learned sometime in the first two years of college that obfuscates a simple concept: “A condition of conflict or anxiety resulting from inconsistency between one’s beliefs and one’s actions.”<sup>1</sup> In this case, it was less my actions than what I was being taught.

After two years of international relations courses, I had come to learn that: the United States had no strategic objectives worth pursuing or supporting; “power” was no longer relevant in international politics; the way to understand international politics was to examine small to tiny questions using statistical methods call “politometrics” that, in the words of former President Clinton’s CIA Director Jim Woolsey, exhibited “an instinct for the capillaries;”<sup>2</sup> and that the real threats to American security were American imperialism, the “imposition” of Western values on countries with other (and supposedly superior) cultures, and that thinking clearly, carefully[,] and dispassionately about strategic issues, and especially about how to avoid nuclear war, would surely bring on human disaster or even extinction.

To understand the extent of my “dissonance,” it might be helpful to recall what had been going on since the late 1960s. American had just emerged from the defeat of Vietnam, Soviet clint regimes were being set up in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. And while Thailand was threatened (looked like dominoes to me), I was assured by professors these were genuine people’s revolutions. Soviet and Cuban

inspired “wars of national liberation” were threatening and toppling regimes in Africa and Central America. The Soviet nuclear arms buildup, supposedly stalled through SALT I treaties, was continuing at breakneck speed. The “Prague Spring” was crushed brutally by Soviet armies and our NATO allies were feeling threatened increasingly by the massive buildup of Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional and nuclear forces in Eastern Europe. Prominent American congressmen were calling for a substantial retreat of American power from Europe while Soviet Propagandists were instructing us that it was only a matter of time before all of Europe was “Finlandized.” And we were months away from the twin shocks of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Such was the state of the IR field, the world, and my mind when I stumbled that fall semester morning into a lecture course entitled: “IR 484: Military Strategy and Arms Control.” What happened there was close to magic. Concepts with fancy buzzwords attached were turned into plain English and rendered understandable, and sometimes laughable! To my amazement, the lecture topics bore more than a passing resemblance to what was actually happening in the world and being reported in the newspapers. Indeed, the reading of newspapers and no-academic professional literature was encouraged along with a rigorous understanding of the scholarly canon on strategy, the nature of international relations, and current strategic problems. Books that were out of print and written decades (maybe thousands of years) ago were preferred over this year’s marginal Ph.D. dissertation turned “scholarly work.” We were encouraged, nay required, to see and understand the world as it is before theorizing what it might be. In sum, imagine the relief I felt in finding a classroom where the Professor and I seemed to be living on the same planet.

Walking into that classroom changed my life forever. I never looked back. A law school bound IR major marking time through his undergraduate studies dropped the idea of the law and began reading not just IR theory, but history, geography, science, and political philosophy to better understand the world around him. I learned that, far from causing mankind’s destruction, it was essential that we study and understand every aspect of the most powerful force on earth,

atomic weapons, if only to ensure that we would never be driven to their use. I learned that strategy and politics are the same. They are about real people in the real world, and that the consequences of strategic mistakes can be enormous, even fatal. And because every strategist must take responsibility for his advice and counsel, the best of the art were both scholar and practitioner. I was not the first student to experience this epiphany in Professor William R. Van Cleave's classroom, nor was I the last. For generations of students, Bill Van Cleave has embodied the qualities of the rigorous scholar and consummate, professional strategist. He set the gold standard for dozens of his students, colleagues, and fellow statesmen.

As his academic career has transitioned from full-time Professor and Department Chair to Professor, *emeritus*, of the Defense and Strategic Studies program (started at the University of Southern California and continued at Missouri State University), it is fitting that his students (and colleagues) honor him with a *festschrift*. It is my humble privilege to offer this [essay]. I hope that through this essay and the many following in this volume, you will see the profound impact this learned man has had on me, countless other students, and the fashioning and conduct of American national security policy.

### **From a Window of Vulnerability to Peace Through Strength**

In a career spanning four decades, Dr. William R. Van Cleave has played a vital and consistent role in addressing the complex, difficult, and dangerous threats faced by the United States, particularly the threats posed by the Cold War with the Soviet Union, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to countries that are hostile to the United States and the basic values of this nation – an enduring faith in democracy and human freedom. Indeed, Dr. Van Cleave's contributions to U.S. national security cannot be exaggerated.

In an era in which the United States is generally recognized as the world's only superpower, it is easy to forget that thirty or forty years ago many Americans believed that the United States was a declining power and that communism would prevail. Some even believed that the country was not worth fighting for. Dr. Van Cleave

spent much of his career fighting such foolishness, providing timely warning to the American people about the serious threats the nation faced and offering sage advice about how to parry those threats.

Unlike many of his academic contemporaries who believed and, in some cases, still believe that the world is made up of “country As” and “country Bs” with no critical differences between them, Bill Van Cleave recognized that the problem facing the United States was not weapons of mass destruction *per se* but, rather, the proliferation of those weapons to hostile totalitarian and authoritarian regimes that trample on basic human rights and crush their people into poverty to support vast military establishments with the aim of waging offensive war for whatever type of ideological or religious fanaticism inspires their corrupt leadership. He never believed that such governments were the wave of the future. Such regimes had to be fought and, true to his U.S. Marine Corps heritage, Bill Van Cleave recognized that such regimes responded to military power, or the lack thereof, and that we needed to build the military establishment required to face those dangers and prevail.

In 2002, President George W. Bush promulgated a new national security strategy to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states. Among the military options the President advocated were missile defense, counterforce capabilities, and the willingness, where necessary, to preempt devastating attacks upon the United States. The administration’s conclusion was that we faced a very uncertain world and that the core element of the new strategy required flexibility and adaptability to preserve our security. Similarly in 1974, Dr. Van Cleave called for a strategy of “Strategic Adaptability.” According to this strategy, he explained, our forces should be structured so that if deterrence failed, it would not necessarily fail completely and with the worst possible outcome. Dr. Van Cleave argued that no matter what we did we could not guarantee that deterrence would not fail. Therefore, a flexible strategy was necessary because it provided options and

hedge[d] against the inability to predict deterrence thresholds for a range of situations, promote[d] the

possibility of escalation control, and increase[d] the opportunities for war termination without major urban damage.<sup>3</sup>

An important component of the 2002 Bush administration's strategy was called the "New Triad." While it put the country in a badly needed new policy direction, its key elements had been advocated by Bill Van Cleave more than thirty years ago. Dr. Van Cleave maintained that we needed a strong military counterforce capability and missile defense because the combination of these factors maximized deterrence and provided the elements of a necessary response to the threat of hostile dictatorships armed with weapons of mass destruction. The 2001 Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review recognized that we had to maintain a nuclear deterrence "second to none," a policy Bill Van Cleave recognized thirty years before and advocated constantly throughout his long career.

"The ABM Treaty is a relic of the past," President George Bush declared in June 2001. He continued: "The days of the Cold War have ended, and so much the Cold War mentality, as far as I'm concerned."<sup>4</sup> Bill Van Cleave knew that the ABM Treaty was conceptually ill-conceived more than thirty years ago. He argued it was unwise to leave our country completely vulnerable to ballistic missile attack and to depend purely upon offensive deterrence, particularly the minimalist variant of deterrence preached by advocates of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Having participated in the negotiation of the ABM Treaty, Dr. Van Cleave was one of the few experts with the courage and foresight to oppose its approval by the United States Senate. Even after the ABM Treaty was approved by the Senate, Dr. Van Cleave saw the need to move beyond it. Indeed, in a chapter of the Strategic Alternatives Team report written in 1979, Bill Van Cleave concluded that we needed to deploy the capability of "defending against damage from small attacks or accidental launches,"<sup>5</sup> a policy which was precluded by the ABM Treaty, but which was subsequently embraced by a bipartisan majority in Congress.

More than thirty years after Dr. Van Cleave's brilliant testimony against the ABM Treaty and twenty-two years after he called for a



limited missile defense of the United States, Dr. Van Cleave was vindicated by President George Bush's courageous decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and, in doing so, to secure the option to deploy a missile defense system capable of providing a highly effective defense of the United States, our friend, allies, and our forces abroad against limited missile threats. The President declared:

Today, I have given formal notice to Russia, in accordance with the treaty, that the United States of America is withdrawing from this almost 30 year old treaty. I have concluded the ABM Treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks.<sup>6</sup>

Moreover, a year later, President Bush announced the initial deployment of a missile defense system, a vital step long advocated by Bill Van Cleave. That defense is coming into existence as we speak.

For forty years, Bill Van Cleave worked tirelessly to maximize the United States' ability to counter WMD threats through the deployment of effective deterrence and counterforce capabilities. Writing in the 1979 Strategic Alternative Team report, he called for the creation and modernization of forces capable

to execute a wide range of options in response to potential actions by an enemy, including a capability for precise attacks on both soft and hard targets, while at the same time minimizing collateral damage.<sup>7</sup>

The need for such capabilities was recognized gradually, at least to some degree, by nearly all subsequent U.S. administrations. As a consequence, they moved away increasingly from the MAD concept of the ABM Treaty era toward the position that Bill Van Cleave championed. It was fully recognized during the Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which concluded that we require appropriate nuclear and improved conventional strike capabilities to expand the options available to the President to protect the American people. The combination of improved strike capabilities and active and passive

defenses maximized the chances that we could deter WMD threats successfully and minimize the consequences if deterrence failed.

Some twenty-five years before the Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review highlighted the importance of credible nuclear capabilities to assure our allies, deter attack, dissuade competition in nuclear arms and, if deterrence failed, defend and defeat potential adversaries, Bill Van Cleave advocated the development of credible nuclear capabilities to deter attack on our NATO allies posed by the massive soviet threat that existed in that era. The threat then was the possibility of "theater wide [attack] against NATO nuclear and conventional forces to exploit the nuclear attack and rapidly seize NATO territory."<sup>8</sup> MAD was not enough to deal with this threat. The United States, Dr. Van Cleave submitted, needed credible nuclear and conventional capabilities in order to deter, defend, and defeat potential adversaries if deterrence failed.

Bil Van Cleave played a key role on the "Team B" analytical exercise which was chartered by former President and the then-Director of Central Intelligence George H.W. Bush to take an independent look at the accuracy of U.S. intelligence estimates concerning Soviet strategic nuclear power. The resulting reports did a great deal to improve the quality of U.S. intelligence estimates. The Team B recognized that, as former Senator Malcolm Wallop wrote:

While the Soviet were beginning the biggest military buildup in history, the NIE's judged that they would not try to build as many missiles as we had. As the Soviets approached our number, the NIE's said they were unlikely to exceed it substantially. When they exceeded it substantially, the NIE's said they would not try for decisive superiority.<sup>9</sup>

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that the Team B report, especially the report concerning technical intelligence questions, "provided some useful recommendations concerning the estimative process."<sup>10</sup> Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, in a statement published with the report, noted that the claim of the Team B scholars

that the “Soviets intended to surpass the United States in strategic arms and are in the process of doing so, has gone from heresy to respectability if not orthodoxy.”<sup>11</sup> Again, Bill Van Cleave played a central role in Team B’s analytical production and subsequent policy impact.

Bill Van Cleave’s influence manifested itself also through his participation on the bipartisan Committee on the Present Danger during the 1970s, when there was growing concern about America’s failure to respond to the challenge posed by the massive Soviet nuclear buildup. Its numerous analytical reports altered perceptions of the growing Soviet nuclear threat inside the “Beltway” and beyond. The Committee’s documentation argued that the SALT negotiating process was flawed, and actually weakened the nation while not addressing the main challenges of the Soviet strategic nuclear buildup. The Committee alerted America to the “window of vulnerability” of U.S. strategic force and the need to take action to close it. In his role as a co-chairman of the Strategic Alternatives Team, Dr. Van Cleave organized the vital intellectual spade work for the defense policy of the Reagan administration that changed the thrust of American defense policy decisively and contributed both to the election of President Reagan and to the future direction of the Reagan administration’s national security policy. As Ronald Reagan’s senior defense advisor during the 1980 campaign, Dr. Van Cleave developed the concept of “quick fixes” to U.S. strategic vulnerabilities that was, at least to some degree, pursued by the Reagan administration. The Reagan administration’s policy approach and defense buildup hastened the demise of the “evil empire” and brought freedom to hundreds of millions of people.

But perhaps Professor Van Cleave’s greatest intellectual contribution was his incisive and devastating critique of the U.S. approach to arms control with the Soviet Union. In his voluminous testimony to the Congress on the ABM Treaty and the SALT I Interim Agreement, his numerous books and articles, and his frequent public appearances (not to mention his fabulous classroom lectures), he documented and provided explanations for the complete inability of the U.S. bureaucracy to negotiate effectively with the Soviet Union. He

described in great detail how U.S. negotiators were unable to maintain any focus on the basic objectives of the negotiation and how the process itself had become a substitute for achieving the original U.S. objectives. Arms control, Dr. Van Cleave stated eloquently, was not a substitute for a credible national defense. Its only possible value was in fact its potential ability to contribute to U.S. strategic objectives. As Dr. Van Cleave stated in 1979: "There is too much emphasis on making needed weapons programs consistent with SALT rather than the other way around."<sup>12</sup>

Dr. Van Cleave never lost sight of the difference between democratic and totalitarian states, observing in 1984 that arms control enthusiasts forget that in Western states "arms are always controlled. They are controlled and limited by traditional values, by political and budgeting processes, and by the influences of the media and public opinion. None of these limiting forces exist in the Soviet Union to any appreciable extent."<sup>13</sup>

Bill Van Cleave's seminal analysis of the SALT I negotiation literally impacted all future U.S. arms control negotiations, even the Carter administration's efforts to negotiate SALT II, which never received Senate consent in part because of Professor Van Cleave's devastating critique. Through his work on the Committee on the Present Danger, the Strategic Alternatives Team, and President Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign, Bill Van Cleave shook up the arms control bureaucracy and played a major role in the development of the Reagan administration's approach to arms control which resulted in agreements with greater substance and direct connection to strategic objectives.

Bill Van Cleave's intellectual output, as scholar, lecturer, defense official, foreign policy advisor, and statesman has been enormous, and would be the envy of many an academic or professional strategist. Funny that it is in many respects the least of his two towering contributions.

## **A School for Strategy**

Professor Van Cleave's most lasting legacy is the myriad of students he taught, trained, mentored, inspired, and helped place in key academic, professional, and governmental positions. As a Professor of International Relations and the Director of the Strategic Studies program at the University of Southern California and Missouri State University, Dr. Van Cleave trained generations of students, many of whom went on to distinguished service in the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government and in industry. His students held and continue to hold senior positions in the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush administrations. Many career professionals in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies received degrees from Professor Van Cleave's program. Many an American scholar would be content to have had the intellectual impact through their writings and testimony that Professor Van Cleave has had. No current American educator has had more influence on U.S. national security issues through his students, both as distinguished academics themselves and through the policymaking process, than Bill Van Cleave.

Professor Van Cleave, through the funding provided by numerous foundations, corporations, and individuals whose trust he richly deserved, built a center for the teaching of strategic thought that has been producing quality students for decades. His multidisciplinary curriculum, grounded in real world problems, and his mentoring approach to students have challenged and rewarded graduate students coming from the Ivy League to the PAC 10. And they are a model for the teaching of graduate students in applied fields.

I had the privilege of teaching with Professor Van Cleave for nearly 10 years at Missouri State University. Early in my tenure there, I remember receiving a call one day from a well-known think tank in Washington, D.C., that had just hired two of Bill's students and was considering two more. A senior manager called, not to inquire about the students (they were going to get the job), but to ask what we were



doing out in Missouri that was different. She claimed that Bill's students, better than many others from the prestigious universities, required very little on-the-job training to become productive staff members. She herself was a graduate of Columbia University and said she thought Bill's DSS students were far better prepared for professional strategic life than she was – coming from the Ivy League. How could that be? The answer was simple. Bill Van Cleave taught students to see the world as it is and through the eyes of the policymaker. What they were able to produce for her company was a by-product of two years of having every assumption challenged and every option debated – against the backdrop of real-world constraints and always with American national interests in clear view.

Bill Van Cleave's students have had an impact on national security not because they are the brightest, although many are the brightest men and women I have known, but because they have mastered the strategists' craft of balancing ends and means and always remembering Churchill's dictum: No matter how great the general (or statesman), sooner or later he must take account of the enemy.

## **Conclusion**

While the main enemies of the United States in the 1960s and 1970s were different from those of the current era, the threat of WMD attack remains and must be countered effectively by the United States. The Soviet Union today may be nothing but a bad historical memory, yet the challenges to our security posed by nations led by dictators, surviving communist dictatorships, radical Islamic state sponsors of terror, and transnational terrorist organizations, have much in common with the threats posed by the totalitarian dictatorships of the middle 20<sup>th</sup> century. Dr. William R. Van Cleave played a major role in mobilizing America to meet this threat and provided the intellectual guidance and wisdom to deal with it. His legacy and that of his intellectual progeny are continuing to help those who seek to guide America through the perilous times we face today. These challenges will be addressed more easily if we recall Dr. Van Cleave's maxim that our strategic policies must always rest on a careful and dispassionate understanding of the nature of the enemies America faces and the need



for America to maintain a military that is truly “second to none” in the face of these threats.

\* \* \*

## About the Author

At the time this essay was originally published in 2007, **J.D. Crouch** was Assistant to President George W. Bush and U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor. Today, he is the CEO & President of the United Services Organization (USO). He previously served as Chief Executive Officer of QinetiQ North America. Before serving in President Bush's White House, Dr. Crouch was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and then U.S. Ambassador to Romania. From 1993 to 2001, and late 2003 to 2004, Dr. Crouch was Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, and before that Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and Military Legislative Assistant to Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyoming). From 1984 to 1986, he served in the Reagan Administration in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and was an advisor to the U.S. Delegation on Nuclear and Space Arms Talks with the former Soviet Union. The views expressed herein are entirely his own, and do not necessarily represent those of anyone else.

This essay is excerpted from **American National Security Policy: Essays in Honor of William R. Van Cleave**, Bradley A. Thayer, ed. (National Institute Press, 2007), ix-xiii. It is reproduced here with gracious permission from the National Institute for Public Policy.<sup>14</sup>

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> “Cognitive dissonance,” *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004); and Answers.com, <http://www.answers.com/topic/cognitive-dissonance>.
- <sup>2</sup> Quoted in Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Presidio, 1982), 42.
- <sup>3</sup> William Van Cleave & Roger W. Barnett, “Strategic Adaptability,” *Orbis*, vol. 18, no. 3, Fall 1974, 42.
- <sup>4</sup> Frank Bruni, “In Spain, Bush Sells Missile Plan, Calling ‘72 Arms Treaty A ‘Relic,’” *New York Times*, June 13, 2001, 1.
- <sup>5</sup> William R. Van Cleave, “The Requirement for and Purpose of Quick Fixes to American Strategic Nuclear Forces,” in William R. Van Cleave & W. Scott Thompson, eds., *Strategic Options for the Early Eighties: What Can Be Done?* (National Strategy Information Center, 1979), 16.
- <sup>6</sup> “Remarks by the President on National Missile Defense,” December 13, 2002, [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-4.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-4.html).
- <sup>7</sup> Van Cleave, “The Requirement and Purpose of Quick Fixes to American Strategic Nuclear Forces,” 16.
- <sup>8</sup> Samuel T. Cohen & William R. Van Cleave, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Capabilities, and Strategy,” in *Toward a New Defense for NATO – The Case for Tactical Nuclear Weapons* (National Strategy Information Center, 1976), 22.
- <sup>9</sup> *The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability and Objectives* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 2.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Van Cleave & Thompson, *Strategic Options for the Early Eighties*, 151.

<sup>13</sup> William Van Cleave, "U.S. Strategic and Arms Control Policy," in Dennis L. Bark, ed., *To Promote Peace – U.S. Foreign Policy in the Mid-1980s* (Hoover Institution, 1984).

<sup>14</sup> **Editor's Note:** *Some alterations to the formatting of this essay have been made in reprinting it here, but the text has not been altered.*

## **“By National Security Professionals, for National Security Professionals”**

by

Christopher A. Ford

One of the great strengths of Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies (DSS) is its dedication to educating national security practitioners through a strong focus not just upon intellectual understanding but also upon approaching this as a field of *applied* knowledge. As you will have already gathered from the earlier essays in this issue of DASSO celebrating DSS’ 20<sup>th</sup> year in the Washington, D.C., area, we seek to educate national security *practitioners*, and informing wise *praxis* has been a central preoccupation of this program ever since its establishment at the University of Southern California (USC) in 1971 by our DSS “Founding Father,” Professor William Van Cleave.

There is an old saying – from *Maxims for Revolutionaries*, an appendix to George Bernard Shaw’s 1905 play, *Man and Superman* – that runs: “He who can, does. He who cannot, teaches.” Shaw sharpens this message by adding further in his *Maxims* that “[a]ctivity is the only road to knowledge.”

Shaw’s aphorism seems rather unfair to academics, of course, and is quite unlikely to be entirely accurate. Yet there is at least a kernel of truth in them, in that activity – that is to say, “doing” – is a powerful route to knowledge, and that those who have “done” things in the world can bring insight of enormous value to education. William Van Cleave was a notable national security practitioner himself, of course, and it is with his example in mind – that of the practical and realistic national-security scholar-practitioner, closely engaged with theory and broader lessons from history, but also

relentlessly focused upon the importance of practical insight from real-world national security experience and the “sausage-making” of actual policy development – that DSS has tried populate its academic “bench” of educators ever since. And we like to think we’ve done a pretty good job of it, bringing together a remarkable group of experts who *teach* for us in large part precisely because they have shown themselves to be so good at *doing*.

One can illustrate this point by looking at the broad range of positions that have been held by current members of the DSS faculty. In the tables that follow, we have drawn upon the faculty list appearing on the DSS website as of August 2025 – the point at which we opened our new offices in Arlington, Virginia – in order to compile a list of national security-related roles that have been occupied at various points by one or more of our current DSS faculty. These positions range across departments and agencies of the U.S. Executive Branch – including the Defense Department, State Department, National Security Council Staff, and the U.S. Congress – as well as positions in national defense-related higher education and in major national think tanks and national laboratories.

The list is long and impressive, and demonstrates not just the deep repertoire of real-world national security experience the DSS program makes available to the students in its doctoral, Master’s, and certificate programs. With apologies to George Bernard Shaw, we don’t think graduate students should have to choose between “doers” and “teachers.” They can have both.



## U.S. Department of Defense

- Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities
- Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation Policy
- Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Crisis Management
- Director of the Defense Technology Administration
- Director for Requirements, U.S. Army
- Brigadier General, U.S. Army
- Director of Space Strategy and Policy, U.S. Space Force
- Chairman, Strategy Policy Panel, U.S. Strategic Command
- Director, Office of Missile Defense Policy
- Chief of Operations for Defense Threat Reduction Agency Operations and Integration Directorate
- Senior Advisor, Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense
- Assistant for Counterproliferation Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy
- NATO Operations Chief, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Member of Strategy, Concepts, and Initiatives Team, Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense
- Strategic Trends Research Manager, Defense Threat Reduction Agency
- Senior Deterrence Analyst, U.S. Strategic Command
- Technical Nuclear Analyst and Senior WMD Scientist, Department of the Air Force
- Physical Scientist, U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency



### **U.S. Department of State**

- Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
- U.S. Ambassador and Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks with North Korea
- Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation
- U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation
- Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
- Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
- Senior Advisor for Strategic Planning, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
- Senior Advisor for Missile Defense Policy, Bureau of Arms Control
- Biological Policy staff, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation



### **National Security Council Staff**

- Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for WMD and Counterproliferation
- Director for Proliferation Strategy (x2)
- Director for Intelligence Programs





### **U.S. Intelligence Community**

- Assistant Director for National Intelligence Mission Performance, Analysis, and Collection for the Director of National Intelligence
- Senior Advisor to the Director of National Intelligence
- Senior GEOINT Authority Collection, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
- Director of Intelligence, NATO
- Consultant to the Director of National Intelligence
- CIA officer, Special Intelligence Service
- CIA officer, counterterrorism
- CIA analyst, Directorate of Analysis



### **U.S. Congress**

- General Counsel, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
- Chief Legislative Counsel, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- Professional staff, Senate Armed Services Committee
- Staff Director, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
- Professional staff, Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives
- Professional staff, Judiciary Committee, House of Representatives



## National Security Education

- Director of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
- Vice President for Academic Affairs, Marine Corps University
- Dean of Students, National Defense University
- Dean, Defense Threat Reduction University
- Commandant, Defense Nuclear Weapons School
- Director, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University
- National Security Studies Department Chair, National Defense University
- Chair in Ethics and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
- Professor, University of Nebraska, Omaha
- Professor of Strategy and Policy, U.S. Naval War College
- Senior Research Fellow at National Defense University
- Professor, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base
- Policy Fellow, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University
- Adjunct Professor School of Strategic Force Studies, U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology
- Professor, Georgetown University
- Associate Dean, School of Strategic Force Studies, U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology
- Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University
- Director of the Center for Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University
- Distinguished Research Fellow, National Defense University
- Dean of Academics, Institute of World Politics
- Professor, Command & Staff College, Marine Corps University
- Professor, American University School of International Service
- Professor, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base
- Adjunct professor, Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service
- Director of the Security Studies Program, Westminster College
- Adjunct Professor, Institute of World Politics



### Think Tanks and Commissions

- President, Institute of World Politics
- Co-founder, National Institute for Public Policy
- Co-founder, National Institute for Deterrence Studies
- Senior Vice President, American Foreign Policy Council
- Commissioner, Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States
- Member, Senior Study Group on Strategic Stability, U.S. Institute of Peace
- Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
- Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution



**Sandia  
National  
Laboratories**

### Independent Expert Bodies

- Director for Defense and Special Programs, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
- Assistant Director, Defense Capabilities & Management Team, Government Accountability Office
- Board of Managers, Sandia National Laboratory
- Global Security External Advisory Board, Sandia National Laboratory
- Consultant, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

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